Reward Tampering Problems and Solutions in Reinforcement Learning: A Causal Influence Diagram Perspective
Can an arbitrarily intelligent reinforcement learning agent be kept under control by a human user? Or do agents with sufficient intelligence inevitably find ways to shortcut their reward signal? This question impacts how far reinforcement learning can be scaled, and whether alternative paradigms must be developed in order to build safe artificial general intelligence. In this paper, we use an intuitive yet precise graphical model called causal influence diagrams to formalize reward tampering problems. We also describe a number of modifications to the reinforcement learning objective that prevent incentives for reward tampering. We verify the solutions using recently developed graphical criteria for inferring agent incentives from causal influence diagrams. Along the way, we also compare corrigibility and self-preservation properties of the various solutions, and discuss how they can be combined into a single agent without reward tampering incentives.